We prove existence of equilibria with proportional transaction costs on asset trading, using homotopy methods.
Introduction
We prove existence of equilibria with proportional transaction costs on asset trading, using homotopy methods. The issue of existence of such equilibria is also related to the existence of bid-ask spread equilibria, or equilibria with taxes and transfers.
Proportional transaction costs are among the most widely used fees in real world …nancial trading. Transaction costs have a signi…cance at the individual level, as they are shown to reduce trading, and at the aggregate level, as they modify asset prices and welfare.
Macroeconomics has explored transaction costs as a reason to explain added consumption and asset price volatility. However, most of the macroeconomic analysis of the problem considers quadratic costs (see Heaton and Lucas (1996) , e.g.). While technically more attractive, that formulation is considered economically less convincing. The partial equilibrium or no arbitrage analysis of transaction costs is copious, especially in continuous-time …nance models of portfolio choice (see Magill and Costantinides (1976) , Davis and Norman (1990) , Jouini and Kallal (1995) , Cvitanic and Karatzas (1996) are only few signi…cant examples). The general equilibrium equivalent is scarce of sources. Foley (1970) studied the case of spot commodity markets; Hahn (1973) and Starrett (1973) extended the analysis to forward commodity markets, while Arrow and Hahn (1999) recently addressed asset markets in equilibrium. In these papers transaction costs are real, in the sense of requiring explicit or implicit use of commodities for purchases or sales. On the other hand, Préchac (1996) introduces nominal transaction costs on asset trading. However, all these contributions either do not deal with equilibrium existence issues, or avoid comparative statics exercises. 1 With homotopy methods, existence can be established through the use 1 In Arrow and Hahn (1999) , say, the constrained optimality analysis is done only for economies where asset markets are active.
of an extended system of equations which paves the way to comparative statics exercises.
A technical di¢culty prevents the comparative statics analysis of the proportional or …xed transaction costs case. The main technical di¢culty is twofold: possible nonconvexities in the budget set, and nondi¤erentiability of the budget line. We show how a degree proof can nevertheless be e¤ectively applied in this context. We can then exploit the di¤erential structure of the equilibrium system to study its generic properties, in particular the constrained optimality of equilibrium.
Nonconvexities arise when buying prices are lower than selling prices, or with …xed fees. The main idea is that nonconvexities can be studied through a traditional argument (see Starr (1969) , say). Using a continuum of identical agents, we get rid of the e¤ects of nonconvexities in the constraint set in the individual optimization problem. The insuing discontinuities in individual demand are integrated out by convexifying the aggregate demand function.
Nondi¤erentiabilities in the budget constraint arise when bid-ask spreads are positive, and also with …xed fees. They are treated using an argument which breaks down the optimization problem in several, but …nite, convex and differentiable programming problems, and compares their solution at equilibrium. Again using the continuum of agents assumption, individuals indi¤erent across any of the …nitely many solutions are arbitrarily assigned to anyone of these equivalent choices. In the aggregate, corresponding fractions of the population are determined, which sum up to the total size of the population.
In this sense, the concept of equilibrium with proportional transaction costs is reminiscent of a combined notion of Nash and competitive equilibrium for large economies (Minelli and Polemarchakis (1999) ). It can be seen as an instance of more general setups where optimization problems mix discrete and continuum choice components.
It should be noted that the above-mentioned studies of transaction costs or taxes eliminate the possibility of transaction (or tax) arbitrage by assuming that costs (bid-ask spreads) and asset payo¤s are both positive (see Jouini and Kallal (1995) and Préchac (1996) , say). While many real assets have positive future payo¤s (such as equity), many derivative products may well have negative payo¤s and even negative expected (subjective) value in the absence of transaction costs. This fact is widely recognized in incomplete markets models, where no sign restriction is imposed on the asset payo¤ matrix. Therefore, a nominally positive bid-ask spread can translate into a real negative spread. Also in the case of equity trading, negative spreads are sometimes possible in real life situations. Bid-ask spreads or transaction costs are adjusted more slowly than asset payo¤s or changes in expectations relative to asset payo¤s, due to information arrival. With multiple market makers, it may happen that 2 For instance, Harris and Schultz (1997) report that Nasdaq's SOES for trading displays as a regular problem the presence of arbitrageurs called SOES bandits by market makers. These traders 'make money by spotting minor pricing discrepancies', and by executing trades across market makers. These kinds of problems are tackled exactly by imposing restricted participation. traders see selling prices above buying prices. This is why the case of 'buying' prices lower than 'selling' prices should also be considered. From a normative viewpoint, it has been recently shown that negative bid-ask spreads can Pareto improve upon zero transaction costs equilibria when markets are incomplete (see Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2000) ). Hence, the case of negative spreads should also be considered based on its normative property.
We provide a uni…ed approach to deal with all cases of zero, negative and positive spreads. To avoid transaction cost (or tax) arbitrage, a no arbitrage condition must be imposed, such as permitting only one side of trading at each time, either the purchase or the sale of the asset. Market participation is therefore restricted when spreads are nonpositive. 
The Model
The notion of equilibrium is standard in two-period, …nite exchange economies with incomplete …nancial assets. For each trader, we assume that the commodity space is R C ++ for each spot, and R G ++ overall. Preferences are representable by a utility function u h : R G ++ ! R which is smooth, di¤erentially strictly increasing, di¤erentially strictly quasi-concave and with indi¤erence surfaces having closure contained in R G ++ . Endowments are in the commodity space. Let E = R HG ++ be the endowment space, and U h be the space of utility functions, endowed with the topology of C 2 -uniform convergence. Let U = £ h U h . An economy will be a pair (e; u) 2 E £ U .
Traders exchange commodities and …nancial assets. There are spot markets for physical commodities at each date and state. Financial asset trading occurs at s = 0. The I …nancial assets have state-contingent payo¤s tomorrow, represented by the matrix Y and expressed in units of commodity c = C, the numéraire commodity, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) . We assume that rank Y = I · S. Asset markets can be incomplete, but no redundancies are allowed.
Asset trading occurs at a cost. This cost in general could take di¤erent forms. For instance, a trader may be asked to pay a …xed fee every time he enters a transaction, irrespective of the sign or size of the exchange. Or the cost could be proportional to the amount traded, whether an asset is purchased or sold.
In this paper, the cost is paid only if the asset is purchased, and it is proportional to the value of the amount bought. Buying asset i costs ¿ i , with ¿ i > ¡1. A case of interest is when ¿ > 0 (and q > 0). So, if trader h wants to buy asset i, i.e., b i+ h > 0, he has to pay a higher price than if he sells it. This price differential, or bid-ask spread, is meant to represent a transaction cost. Of course, this could be motivated by some form of asymmetric information between the exchange house and the trader. We do not try to explain such spread in the model. Instead, we take it as given and explore its e¤ects on equilibrium.
Transaction costs are collected by an exchange house. Each trader receives an amount of money w h which is interpreted either as a lump-sum transfer or as the trader's share of the exchange house's pro…ts from running the exchange operations. These pro…ts come from the collected transaction costs, and are measured in the numéraire commodity.
Trader h's budget constraint is then:
for all s > 0 also written more compactly as
where -dimensional matrix containing only the commodity C prices on the diagonal; …nally
The more general case, a cost for trading ¿ i paid whether a trader buys or sells the asset, could also be studied. Then this cost would appear added to 3 I(x) = 1 if x > 0, and I(x) = 0 otherwise. Here m i is a real number in the interval
both the buying and selling price. If the buying and selling prices are equal, the trader's …nancial trading balance is then
In fact, one could also easily consider a transaction cost di¤erent for purchases and sales. If the buying and selling prices are di¤erent, then having same transaction cost but di¤erent prices corresponds to the current formulation. Far from adding any conceptual or technical di¢culty, the general case only adds notational burden to the model, and therefore it will not be considered here.
It should also be noted that we are implicitly imposing the restriction that individual trade occurs only on one side of the market, either buying or selling, and not both. This is without loss of generality when q i > 0, and ¿
i¸0
, so
. As one can easily show, no trader would want to be on both sides of the market at the same time with these prices. When q i < 0, then the bid-ask spread is reversed even if ¿ i > 0, and this constraint is not without loss of generality: transaction costs allow pro…ts from buying and selling at the same time. To eliminate this possibility, we impose that no such trades are possible. We want to leave open the possibility that such negative bid-ask spreads exist, as previous work shows that they can be Pareto-improving (as mentioned in the Introduction).
From now on, p s;C = 1 all s; this is the standard commodity-C normalization spot by spot.
Equilibrium with transaction costs (¿ ; w) requires that:
(1) taking prices, transaction costs and transfers as given (and of course payo¤s and endowments);
(M ) markets clear, i.e., P h z h = 0 and P h b h = 0; and (T ) zero pro…ts for the exchange house, or
Condition (T ) is consistent with a notion of competition among exchange houses. Nothing excludes that the left-hand side in this equation be negative, hence w h can also be negative.
It should be noted that in (1) there is a discontinuity at b i h = 0 when ¿ i 6 = 0. This discontinuity is the cause of nondi¤erentiability at b i h = 0 and of possible nonconvexity of the budget constraint. However, these problems will be bypassed by the construction below. First, we describe the equilibrium set in the absence of transaction costs, when ¿ = 0 and w = 0. The results for this case essentially mimick those in Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2000), and are presented here for the sake of completeness.
Zero and quasi-zero transaction costs equilibria
At ¿ = 0 and w = 0, the equilibrium is nothing but a standard …nancial equilibrium; hence we have the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1 At ¿ = 0 and w = 0, an equilibrium exists for all economies (e; u) 2 E £ U . (see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) .)
The equilibrium at ¿ = 0 and w = 0 can be represented as a system of equations (including the redistribution equation for (T )):
. . .
++ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers, for all h. Call this system F (»; ¿ ; e; u) = 0 where » = ((x h ; b h ;¸h) ; p; q).
We compute the derivative of the equilibrium system with respect to the endogenous variables and controls at ¿ = 0 and w = 0, or D »;¿ ;w F . We notice that this matrix has full row rank when restricting attention to all the columns excluding the derivatives with respect to ¿ and w; and all rows except the last one (denote this matrix by D » F n ). This is standard regularity of zero transaction costs equilibrium.
When restricting attention to columns up to one corresponding to the derivative with respect to w h ; some h (or ¿ i some i); D »;¿ ;w F is square and has full rank at ¿ = 0 and w = 0 for a generic set of economies, as it is easily shown. Formally, we state this result as a lemma (the proof is standard and omitted). Let ¿ = (¿ 0 ; ¿ 00 ) with ¿ 0 = ¿ i some i, and similarly w = (w 0 ; w 00 ) with w 0 = w h some h. As a corollary to this Lemma, we have existence of equilibria for small (¿ ; w) 6 = 0. We conclude this section with an accessory result, which is useful in studying the properties of transaction cost equilibria. It states that, typically in incomplete markets economies with zero transaction costs, there is su¢cient variation of traders' evaluation of commodity price e¤ects.
Lemma 4 At ¿ = 0 and w = 0; at any equilibrium when S + 1 ¡ I¸H, the matrix 
Global existence
In the previous section we noted that existence of equilibria with transaction costs and transfers could be obtained locally around zero, by using an implicit function theorem argument. While that technique (Lemma 3) is su¢cient for the constrained suboptimality analysis of standard incomplete markets equilibrium, it leaves open the question of general existence of equilibria for arbitrary ¿ ; w. We close the gap in this section. Somewhat surprisingly, we will show existence by means of a degree proof. As we mentioned earlier, the di¢culty arises as the budget constraint is either nondi¤erentiable or nonconvex, precisely at the individual no trade point, when buying and selling prices are di¤erent. At …rst sight, this seems to prevent the use of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and of the extended system of equations to represent an equilibrium. Hence it looks as if degree theory could not be applied to the extended system, which is so useful to study the constrained optimality of equilibrium (see Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2000) for the case ¿ = 0).
However, it turns out that the extended system can be e¤ectively used, by patching together several, but …nitely many di¤erential problems which together represent the individual optimum. 4 We consider solving L = 2 I di¤erential problems for each trader, each for one combination of constraints on purchases and sales of assets, everything else equal. That is, all these problems are solved at the same commodity and asset prices, and at the same transaction costs and transfers. For each l, let b i;l h be the holding of asset i for trader h. There is going to be a subset of assets I + (l) de…ned as I + (l) = fi 2 I j b i;l h¸0 g and a subset I ¡ (l) de…ned as
otherwise Hence, we solve the utility maximization problem at prices p; q, transaction costs ¿ and transfers w h with the additional nonnegativity constraints e b i;l h¸0 , all i. Notice that when
these restrictions are without loss of generality because traders only consider being on one side of the market for each asset at the optimum. When the bid-ask spread is negative, this entails the additional no arbitrage restriction that trades can only be made at most on one side of the market, for each asset. In both cases, we proceed as follows. Once we have solved the L di¤erential problems, we compute the indirect utility for each case, utilities are compared and problem l is selected if it yields the highest possible utility. Consumption and asset portfolios are chosen correspondingly. Note that there may be multiple l satisfying the utility maximizing condition. Then we let µ l h be the weight assigned to problem l, with µ It is obvious that this procedure equivalently solves the original utility maximization problem (H). The advantage of this method of solution is that it leads to an equilibrium representation through a system of equations.
To illustrate what happens, consider an economy with H = 2, C = 1; I = 2 = S; two Arrow securities, and no consumption at time zero. This is a standard walrasian economy, where purchases and sales have di¤erent prices, q i (1 + ¿ i ) and q i ; respectively. The budget line is:
h , for i = 1; 2. If ¿ 2 = 0 and ¿ 1 > 0, the budget line has a kink at x h = e h , but it is convex. If Arrow securities have negative payo¤s, their prices q will be negative, and the situation with ¿ 1 > 0 corresponds to one with standard Arrow securities and ¿ 1 < 0. In this case, the budget constraint has a kink at the no trade point, and it is nonconvex. In both cases, direct use of the …rst order conditions seems impossible. However, it is easily observed that each trader solves the equivalent (discrete) choice problem of looking for the optimum assuming b 
h . In this situation, a correct choice of µ l h is necessary for the interpretation. Hence we shall think of µ l h as the proportion of traders of type h choosing trading strategy l; with a continuum of traders of type h. So equilibria for ¿ i < 0 some i (and Y > 0) will be approximate equilibria in large but …nite economies. Note also that the system will typically (in utilities) not be in this situation.
A second issue in de…nition of equilibrium is the value of w h , which cannot be too large when negative, otherwise it forces traders to negative consumption. 5 In order to deal with this problem, a lower bound on w h must simply be imposed, such that
In fact, we will specialize to the uniform redistribution case, where w h = (1=H)¼, so that P h w h = ¼, the total pro…t (or loss) from collecting transaction fees ¿ . The general case of nonuniform w h can also be dealt with, and more easily as we would have extra variables, to be treated as parameters.
Let ! = (¿ ; e), and let ! ¤ = (¿ ¤ ; e ¤ ) be a 'test' point. The lower bound condition here must hold for ¼. Also letting t 2 [0; 1] be a homotopy parameter, we can represent an equilibrium for arbitrary ! as the solution to the following system of equations at t = 0:
Equations (1)¡ (3) hold for all l = 1; :::; L, all h, and represent the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem l; equations (4) and (5) hold for l 6 = L, all h, equation (6) holds for all h; together, they represent how we patch together all the L problems to solve for (H) using a di¤erential approach; equations (7) ¡ (9) are nothing but the market clearing and zero net pro…t conditions; …nally, equation (10) guarantees that each trader always has a positive endowment of the numéraire commodity.
As for the notation, b Note that an equilibrium is expressed as the zeros of the continuous function F (»; t; !) = 0 computed at t = 0. Here F represents the left-hand side of (E), and
¥ is an open subset of a Euclidean space, and dim ¥ is equal to the number of equations in (E). Moving t away from zero deforms the equilibrium system into a system of equations which is better suited for analysis and takes the arbitrary ! to the test point ! ¤ ; when t = 1. We will show that this homotopy satis…es all the assumptions to claim that the degree modulo 2 of the function F at the test point, i.e., deg 2 (F t=1 ; f0g) ; is the same as the degree computed at t = 0; therefore at the function representing a transaction cost equilibrium and for arbitrary parameters !.
To prove existence we compute deg 2 (F t ; f0g) for t = 1 (see Lloyd, (1978) ). We proceed by …nding …rst the test point ! ¤ . Let ¿ ¤ = 0. Note that this is now a standard incomplete markets economy. Let u ¤ be any utility satisfying the maintained assumptions, and let e ¤ = e P O 2 R GH ++ ; a corresponding Pareto optimal allocation for total resources r 2 R
At this Pareto optimum, which exists and is unique for all r; u 2 ; ::u H , there is a unique set of multipliers p
We then show that there is only one zero of the function F 1 ; that is, at ! ¤ .
Lemma 5 There is a unique array » ¤ such that F (» ¤ ; 1; !) = 0.
Proof. We compare equations (3) with equations (1) and (7) in (E). Given the price normalization p s;C = 1, we uniquely identify from (3)¸s
in equations (1) ; for l 1 = 1; :::; L; h = 1. We also uniquely identify¸l
for all l and all h > 1: Then (1) and (7) have a unique solution with x l¤ h = e ¤ h ; all l, all h, and prices and multipliers as above. Note that in (7) the solution is independent of µ Lemma 6 A has full rank.
Proof. To see this, compute the derivative A and premultiply by the vector ¢», to get:
where
We will show that the only solution to this system of equations is ¢» = 0. Note that ¢® 
where we note that ¤ 
Now, from equations (7) and (8), premultiplying by (¤ ¤ ¢p n )
T and ¢q Hence we know that deg 2 (F 1 ; f0g) = 1. We are left to show that we can correctly homotope this function to all functions F t at all parameter values !, without changing the degree. For this, we have the following lemma.
Proof. We show that the set is sequentially compact: starting from an arbitrary sequence f» n ; t n g 1 n=1 ½ F ¡1 (0); we show that it has a subsequence (to simplify notation, the sequence itself) converging to (»; t), with (»; t) 2 F ¡1 (0 
> 0 all n; h, and it is bounded away from zero. Using the boundary condition on utilities, it must be that x h g we get convergence of fw n h + (1 ¡ t n )¯ng. Now suppose that t = 1. Since at t = 1 there is only one solution » ¤ and the function F is continuous both in » and t, convergence is guaranteed, and in particular of f¼ n g (from (3)) and f¯ng (from (10); observe that ¼ ¤ = 0).
Suppose that 1 > t¸0. Using (3) and (10), again we get convergence of fw Finally, the cases where 0 < µ 1 h < 1, all h, as well as where µ 1 h has a value di¤erent across traders, follow from the previous ones.
To conclude, we have the following existence theorem.
Theorem 8 For any economy (e; u); an equilibrium with transaction costs ¿ exists.
Proof.
Since ¥ is open, hence a boundaryless manifold, dim ¥ is equal to the number of equations in (E), F (:; !) is continuous, and the space of ! satisfying our assumptions is path-connected, F t is a continuous homotopy. Using Lemma 7, deg 2 (F t ; f0g) is well-de…ned and identical for all t 2 [0; 1] and all !. Lemmas 5 and 6 show that deg 2 (F t=1 (:; !); f0g) = 1, hence following Lloyd [14] deg 2 (F t (:; !); f0g) = 1 for t = 0 and all !. Concluding, an equilibrium with transaction costs ¿ exists for all economies e; u.
This theorem provides the rigorous basis for studying comparative statics issues in asset markets with transaction costs, the subject of further research. One weakness of the theorem is that the payo¤ matrix has exogenous rank, …xed at I, the number of assets. To study the e¤ects of transaction costs on trading decisions, we need to extend the framework to allow for the possibility that the rank depend on endogenous variables, such as future asset prices. Again, this can be the subject of further research.
